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OPINION
_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Suspecting that Appellant Michael Matthews and another man were about to rob a
check cashing store, Philadelphia Police stopped Matthews and conducted a frisk of his
person. After learning that Matthews was wanted on two outstanding warrants, he was
arrested, and the backpack he was carrying was seized. Officers placed Matthews in the
backseat of a police car and opened and searched the backpack prior to placing it in the
trunk. Inside, police discovered a handgun, gloves, and duct tape. Before trial, Matthews
moved to suppress the evidence recovered, arguing that the warrantless search of his
backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. The Government responded that the search
was necessary to ensure the safety of the officers. For the following reasons we will
affirm the District Court’s denial of Matthews’ motion to suppress.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Surveillance and Arrest
After receiving a tip that several black males wearing burkas—head-to-toe

garments traditionally worn by Muslim women—had been loitering outside a check
cashing store during opening hours, Philadelphia Police established surveillance outside
of the store. On the morning of Friday, June 12, 2009, officers noticed two black men
2

acting suspicious. The officers eventually approached the men, one of whom was
Michael Matthews. At the time, Matthews was carrying a green and white striped
“suitcase backpack” on one of his shoulders. App. 180; see App. 1114A, 1114B (photos
of backpack).
Officer Michael Frisco and his partner Officer Joanne Pomeroy, an eight-year
veteran of the force, asked Matthews to place his backpack on the ground and put his
hands in the air, which he did. Frisco then proceeded to pat-down Matthews and
confirmed that he had no weapons on his person. Matthews provided Frisco with
identification upon request, and a subsequent warrant check uncovered that Matthews had
two active bench warrants—one for theft of services and one for four scofflaw tickets.
As a result of the active warrants, Matthews was placed under arrest.
Officer Frisco handcuffed Matthews and walked him across the street to a police
car while Officer Pomeroy recovered Matthews’ backpack from the ground. 1 After
Matthews had been secured in the backseat of the car—handcuffed with the door closed
and locked from the outside—Pomeroy opened and searched Matthews’ backpack while
standing next to the car. Inside she found a roll of duct tape, a pair of gloves, and a .22
caliber handgun. 2 The officers then placed the backpack into the trunk of the police car
and transported it, along with Matthews, to the police station for processing.

1

While Matthews was being arrested, another officer approached the car from which
Matthews had exited, and looked inside. In the back seat, on the floor boards, he
observed “muslim garb.” App. 106, 147.

2

Officer Frisco listed these items on a property receipt, which he prepared at the police
station some time later. See App. 186-87; Tr. of Jan. 8, 2013 Oral Arg. at 33-34.
3

B.

Suppression Hearings
In January 2010 Matthews was charged in a five-count superseding indictment

with one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); two
counts of attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1985; one count of carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);
and one count of possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g). Matthews promptly moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his
backpack, arguing that (1) the evidence was derived from an investigatory stop that was
illegal and thus constituted “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and (2) even if the initial stop
was lawful, the warrantless search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment
because it did not fall under any of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the initial suppression hearing held on March 26, 2010, the Government argued
that the search of Matthews’ backpack was valid under the “search incident to arrest”
exception. After the Government presented its evidence, the District Court expressed
skepticism that the search could be justified as a search incident to Matthews’ arrest, as
Matthews was secured in the police car at the time of the search. Ultimately, the Court
deferred ruling on the issue and allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefing.
In its supplemental briefing, the Government argued that the search of Matthews’
backpack could be justified either as a search incident to arrest or as a valid “inventory
search,” or, in the alternative, that the contraband in the backpack would have been
inevitably discovered when the backpack was inventoried at the police station. In support
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of its inventory search argument, the Government submitted evidence regarding the
Philadelphia Police Department’s policy for searches prior to transporting an arrestee.
Philadelphia Police Department Memorandum 99-14 (hereinafter “Policy 99-14”
or the “policy”) addresses the search of personal property seized pursuant to an arrest.
The policy reads as follows:
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

II.

III.

In the case of U.S. v. Chadwick, the United States Supreme
Court established guidelines regarding the search of luggage
seized pursuant to an arrest.

POLICY
A.

The scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to
the person arrested and the area within his/her immediate
control.

B.

The search of personal property immediately associated with
the person of the defendant does not require a search warrant.
(Example: Wallets, pocketbooks, etc.)

C.

When an individual carrying a suitcase, briefcase, footlocker,
etc. is arrested, the luggage may be seized. However, the
contents of the luggage are generally not within the
immediate control of the person arrested and therefore, the
luggage can only be opened pursuant to the guidelines set
forth below.

GUIDELINES
A.

When the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that
a suitcase, briefcase, footlocker, etc. may contain contraband
or fruits or instruments of the crime, the luggage shall be
seized but NOT opened until a search warrant has been
properly secured.

B.

In all cases in which exigent circumstances exist, an
immediate search may be made at the time of the arrest.
5

However, the exigent circumstances must be clearly
describable.
Examples of exigent circumstances:
- Immediately dangerous instrumentalities, e.g. explosives.
- Definite possibility that evidence may be destroyed (highly
perishable evidence, e.g. blood).
C.

When the arresting officer has no reason to believe that the
luggage contains contraband or evidence, the luggage shall
be seized and held in police custody for safekeeping.
1.

A Property Receipt (75-3) will be issued for the
luggage in accordance with the procedures outlined in
Directive 91.

2.

The luggage will be opened and inventoried in the
presence of the person from whom it was seized.

3.

The contents will be itemized on the Property Receipt.

App. 274-75 (italics added for emphasis, underlines and capitalization in original).
When the suppression hearing resumed on June 15, 2010, Officer Pomeroy was
called to testify first. When asked why she opened Matthews’ bag, Pomeroy testified that
“before I put personal belongings in my car, I’m going to go through it. It’s for safety,
for my safety, my co-workers’ and . . . the defendant himself.” App. 297. She
emphasized that this was not a search for contraband, but that she had “to make sure that
bag is safe before [she] put it in [her] car.” App. 298. She testified that she had
conducted this type of search “every single time” that she had made an arrest in the field
prior to transporting the arrestee, and that “it’s how [officers were] trained to do it from
the beginning in the academy.” App. 298. Pomeroy noted that if the arresting officer did
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not search an arrestee’s property prior to transporting it to the police station, and the cell
block attendant discovered “some kind of contraband, some kind of weapon [brought]
into the cell block” when the arrestee was being booked, then the arresting officer “could
actually be physically reprimanded.” App. 302. On direct examination she was not
asked about, and never mentioned, Policy 99-14.
On cross-examination, Matthews’ counsel questioned Pomeroy about Policy 99-14
and its edict that an arresting officer must obtain a search warrant when he or she has
probable cause to believe that a bag may contain contraband. Pomeroy testified that this
requirement did not apply to the search of Matthews’ backpack because she “had
absolutely no reason to believe at that time that Mr. Matthews was involved in anything.”
App. 315. However, she also testified that she had never before obtained a search
warrant before opening an arrestee’s luggage or containers, nor knew of any other
officers who did so under these circumstances.
Lieutenant Francis Healy, special legal counsel to the Philadelphia Police
Commissioner, also testified regarding departmental policies. According to Healy, the
purpose of Policy 99-14 is to outline the circumstances under which a police officer can
legally conduct a search of an arrestee’s bags. He testified that, according to the policy,
if police officers do not have probable cause to believe a bag contains contraband, “they
would just open it and inventory it in front of the defendant at that time, . . . catalogue the
property, whatever it may be, and transport it along with the prisoner to the local [police
station].” App. 322. The first purpose of such a search, he testified, is for officer safety
and to ensure that hazardous materials are not permitted inside of a police facility. The
7

second purpose is to protect officers from allegations that an arrestee’s personal property
was stolen. Healy testified that Pomeroy’s search of Matthews’ backpack was consistent
with departmental policy. He also stated that had Pomeroy not opened the bag on the
street, the bag inevitably would have been searched at the police station when Matthews
was processed.
In its briefing before the District Court, the Government emphasized that because
Matthews was arrested “on a busy street in an urban setting[,] [t]he police were
compelled to take his backpack with him upon his arrest at the intersection. They could
not leave it in the street but had to transport it with the arrestee.” App. 268.
C.

The District Court Opinion
Soon after the suppression hearing, the District Court denied Matthews’ motion to

suppress. The Court held that the initial stop of Matthews was proper, as the officers had
reasonable suspicion to believe that Matthews was involved in criminal activity based on
the totality of the circumstances, and that the arrest was proper due to Matthews’
outstanding warrants. 3 The District Court then considered whether the search of
Matthews’ backpack could be justified under any of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The Court determined that the search could not be considered a valid search
incident to Matthews’ arrest, as to qualify as such the backpack would have had to have
been in an area within Matthews’ “immediate control” at the time of the search. Since
Matthews was handcuffed and locked in the back of a police car at the time of the search,

3

Matthews does not contest this ruling on appeal. See Matthews’ Br. at 3-4.
8

it was clear that he “could not gain access to the contents of his backpack to harm the
police officers or to destroy evidence.” United States v. Matthews, Crim. A. No. 09-612,
2010 WL 2671388, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2010). However, the Court concluded that the
search qualified as a valid inventory search, finding that Officer Pomeroy searched the
backpack “pursuant to long-standing and clearly articulated Philadelphia Police
Department policy on the search and seizure of luggage.” Id., at *7. The Court found
that because Matthews’ arrest was based on warrants unrelated to the alleged attempted
robbery, there was no probable cause to search his backpack. Thus, it found that the
search fell under Section III.C of Policy 99-14 and did not require a search warrant. Id.
In a footnote, the District Court observed that, even if the search was not a valid
inventory search at the scene of the arrest, the contents of the bag were admissible
because they “inevitably would have been discovered when the bag was inventoried at
the police station.” Id., at *7 n.6.
Matthews was convicted by jury of conspiracy, attempted robbery, carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm after
conviction of a felony, and was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment. He has filed an
appeal challenging his judgment of conviction and sentence.
II. DISCUSSION 4

4

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court
had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We review “the District
Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings
and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those
facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
9

The Fourth Amendment affords protections against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” of a person’s “effects.” U.S. Const. amend IV. “[O]ur analysis begins . . . with
the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)). “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Such exceptions have been created where
courts have found that “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement
so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The potentially applicable exceptions are addressed below.
A.

The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
“Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful

arrest. The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation
that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (internal citations
omitted). “[P]olice may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee’s
‘immediate control,’ meaning ‘the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.’” Id. at 335 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1960)). However, “[o]nce law enforcement officers have [exclusive control
over] luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee . . . , and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to
10

the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer
an incident of the arrest.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) abrogated on
other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
In United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010), we held that as long as
there is “a reasonable possibility” that an arrestee could destroy evidence or gain access
to a weapon in the container or area being searched, the search is permissible. Id. at 321.
Although this standard is a “lenient” one, it “requires something more than the mere
theoretical possibility that a suspect might access a weapon or evidence.” Id. “In
determining whether an object is conceivably accessible to the arrestee, we are to assume
that he was neither an acrobat nor Houdini.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 267
(3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, there was no
reasonable possibility that Matthews could have accessed the backpack at the time
Officer Pomeroy executed the search, as he was handcuffed in the back of a locked police
car. Thus, the District Court was correct in concluding that the search could not be
justified under the search incident to arrest exception.
B.

The Inventory Search Exception
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of inventory searches in

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), where it concluded that warrantless
searches of automobiles impounded or otherwise lawfully in police custody are
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when they are conducted “pursuant to standard
police procedures.” Id. at 372. Inventory searches are justified by “three distinct needs:
the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; the protection
11

[of] the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection
of the police from potential danger.” Id. at 369 (internal citations omitted).
In Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), the Court extended the inventory
search exception to cover stationhouse searches of an arrestee’s personal effects, holding
that “it is not ‘unreasonable’ for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in
accordance with established inventory procedures.” Id. at 648. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court distinguished between the reasonableness of searches at the
stationhouse prior to being placed in confinement and the searches at the time and place
of an arrest, finding that “[p]olice conduct that would be impractical or unreasonable—or
embarrassingly intrusive—on the street can more readily—and privately—be performed
at the station.” Id. at 645.
In Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court discussed what degree of
regulations are necessary to ensure that the “standardized criteria” for an inventory search
satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 4. The Court held that an inventory policy must
not allow so much latitude to police officers that the inventory search could be turned
into a “purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, the Court acknowledged that such searches need not
“be conducted in a totally mechanical ‘all or nothing’ fashion,” and that “[a] police
officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container
should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of
the container itself.” Id.
12

Following Wells, our precedent has established that in order for criteria regulating
inventory searches to be sufficiently “standardized” under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he
criteria or routine must limit an officer’s discretion in two ways: first, as to whether to
search . . . , and second, as to the scope of [the] search.” United States v. Mundy, 621
F.3d 283, 288 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). In Mundy, we considered a policy
regarding the search of an impounded vehicle that directed police officers to “conduct[] a
vehicle inventory describing any . . . personal property of value left in the vehicle” and
limited the scope of the search by stating that “[n]o locked areas, including the trunk area,
will be forced open while conducting an inventory.” Id. at 290. We held that the policy
“provided sufficiently standardized criteria regulating the scope of a permissible
inventory search—including searches of closed containers.” Id. at 293.
Mundy also addressed what level of compliance with a departmental policy is
necessary to ensure that the warrantless search satisfies the inventory search exception.
While the officers in Mundy “produced an inventory of items seized from the vehicle on
property receipts, including the narcotics,” they failed to “complete a Towing Report
describing personal effects left in the vehicle,” which was required by the policy. Id.
However, we held that lack of perfect compliance did not render the search unreasonable,
stating that “[a]lthough compliance with procedures ‘tends to ensure the intrusion is
limited to carrying out the government’s caretaking function,’ failure to follow through
with standard procedures does not necessarily render the search unreasonable.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Mayfield, 161 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1998)). Because “[t]he
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search . . . was undertaken pursuant to established procedures and standardized criteria
designed to produce an inventory,” we found it to be reasonable. Id. at 294.
Here, the District Court determined that Officer Pomeroy’s search of Matthews’
backpack was a valid inventory search, conducted pursuant to well-established police
procedures. However, Matthews contends that to the extent there was a standardized
procedure in place, it was not followed in this case.
“‘The existence of . . . a valid [standardized inventory search] procedure may be
proven by reference to either written rules and regulations or testimony regarding
standard practices.’” Id. at 290 n.5 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 65
(2d Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). Philadelphia Police Department Policy 99-14 was
identified by the Government as the relevant procedure in this case. The policy purports
to “establish[] guidelines regarding the search of luggage seized pursuant to an arrest.”
App. 274. Under Section III.A of the policy:
When the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a suitcase,
briefcase, footlocker, etc. may contain contraband or fruits or instruments
of the crime, the luggage shall be seized but NOT opened until a search
warrant has been properly secured.
App. 274 (emphasis added, capitalization in original). However, under Section III.C of
the policy:
When the arresting officer has no reason to believe that the luggage
contains contraband or evidence, . . . [t]he luggage will be opened and
inventoried in the presence of the person from whom it was seized.
App. 275 (emphasis added).

14

As we pointed out at oral argument, this creates a “reverse Catch-22”: If a police
officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee’s luggage contains contraband, he
must get a warrant prior to searching it, pursuant to Section III.A. Tr. of Jan. 8, 2013
Oral Arg. at 18. However, if a magistrate determines that the officer lacks probable cause
and denies the warrant application, the officer may then immediately open the luggage
and search it pursuant to Section III.C. 5 Thus, Policy 99-14 fails to place any limitations
whatsoever on the scope of the officer’s discretion in conducting such a search, as the
only purported limitation—that officers must obtain a search warrant if they have
probable cause to believe the luggage contains contraband—is illusory.
At oral argument the Government conceded that Policy 99-14 imposes “a
superfluous requirement of probable cause that conflicts with Supreme Court . . .
decisions on point [that say that] probable cause is irrelevant.” Id. at 20. Still, the
5

The following colloquy took place at oral argument:
THE COURT: [L]et’s assume the police officer, believing that there was
probable cause, that the bag contained contraband, similar to what your
opponent is arguing, and he went and he attempted to get a search warrant
for the bag. But for some reason the magistrate denies the warrant, denies
the application on the ground that there was no probable cause. Could the
officer then conduct an inventory search?
GOVERNMENT: I think the officer would be required to conduct an
inventory search.
THE COURT: What is the point of that first requirement then? . . . [I]t just
seems that there’s absolutely no point to the probable cause requirement
because I can always open the bag before I take the individual—
GOVERNMENT: Exactly, your Honor.

Tr. of Jan. 8, 2013 Oral Arg. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
15

Government urges us to uphold the search of Matthews’ backpack as an inventory search
“because it was conducted pursuant to a standard practice,” id. at 29, and “all that’s
needed to pass constitutional muster is a standardized procedure that is designed to
produce an inventory that doesn’t allow the officers latitude to search indiscriminately for
evidence,” id. at 19-20. The Government is correct in its assessment of the law. As we
recognized in Mundy, “‘the Supreme Court has not required an absence of expectation of
finding criminal evidence as a prerequisite to a lawful inventory search.’” 621 F.3d at
294 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 2008)). Indeed, as long
as the search “is performed under standardized procedures for legitimate custodial
purposes,” the officer’s expectations are irrelevant. Id. (quoting Lopez, 547 F.3d at 372).
Still, assuming without deciding that Policy 99-14 constitutes a valid standardized
procedure to govern searches of arrestees’ personal belongings, the question remains as
to whether Officer Pomeroy’s search of Matthews’ backpack was conducted in
accordance with the policy. The record indicates that it was not. During the June 2010
suppression hearing, Pomeroy made clear that she always searches arrestees’ personal
belongings without a warrant. Viewing these warrantless searches to be justified in all
circumstances by safety concerns, Pomeroy testified that she searches an arrestee’s
personal belongings “every single time” she makes an arrest and had never previously
sought a warrant for such a search. App. 297-98. This testimony cannot be reconciled
with Section III.A of Policy 99-14, which requires officers who have probable cause to
believe that an arrestee’s luggage may contain contraband to seize it, “but NOT open[]
[it] until a search warrant has been properly secured.” Nor can Pomeroy’s search be
16

reconciled with Section III.C.2 of the policy, which states that “[w]hen the arresting
officer has no reason to believe that [seized] luggage contains contraband or evidence . . .
[t]he luggage will be opened and inventoried in the presence of the person from who it
was seized.” App. 275. While Pomeroy testified that she opened Matthews’ backpack
next to the police vehicle in which he was detained, she did not inventory the items at that
time; instead, Officer Frisco was left to type up an inventory receipt sometime later when
he returned to the police station. Thus, we conclude that Officer Pomeroy’s warrantless
search of Matthews’ backpack was not conducted “pursuant to established procedures
and standardized criteria designed to produce an inventory,” and cannot be justified under
the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement. 6 Mundy, 621 F.3d at 294.
While the District Court erred in its inventory search analysis, “[w]e may affirm a
district court for any reason supported by the record.” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533,
535 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we will proceed to discuss an alternative rationale
for the search.
C.

Search Pursuant to the Transportation of an Arrestee
In United States v. Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to

believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained marijuana. The agents
tracked the locker as the defendants removed it from a train and carried it through the
6

Accordingly, we need not decide if an “inventory search” conducted outside of the
stationhouse comports with the Fourth Amendment, even if governed by standardized
procedures. As the Supreme Court recognized in Lafayette, “the factors justifying a
search of the person and personal effects of an arrestee upon reaching a police station but
prior to being placed in confinement are somewhat different from the factors justifying an
immediate search at the time and place of arrest.” 462 U.S. at 645.
17

station to a waiting car. Moments after the defendants lifted the locker into the trunk of
the car the agents arrested them and seized the locker. The defendants were transported
to a federal building along with the locker, which was eventually searched and found to
contain large amounts of marijuana. In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme
Court concluded that the warrantless search of the locker was unconstitutional, holding
that if police have probable cause to believe that an arrestee’s “luggage or other property
seized at the time of an arrest” contains contraband or evidence of a crime, the
warrantless search of such property violates the Fourth Amendment. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
at 15. The Court reasoned that “[u]nlike searches of the person, searches of possessions
within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of
privacy caused by the arrest.” Id. at 16 n.10 (internal citations omitted). The Court did
note however:
there may be other justifications for a warrantless search of luggage taken
from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if officers have reason
to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous
instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to
the station house without opening the luggage and disarming the weapon.
Id. at 15 n.9. Furthermore, the Court contrasted the warrantless search of luggage which
officers had probable cause to believe contained contraband with “noncriminal inventory
searches, where probable cause to search is irrelevant” and “the salutary functions of a
warrant simply have no application.” Id. at 10 n.5.
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, advocated the adoption of “a clearcut rule
permitting property seized in conjunction with a valid arrest in a public place to be
searched without a warrant.” Id. at 21 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). As he explained:
18

A person arrested in a public place is likely to have various kinds of
property with him: items inside his clothing, a briefcase or suitcase,
packages, or a vehicle. In such instances the police cannot very well leave
the property on the sidewalk or street while they go to get a warrant. The
items may be stolen by a passer-by or removed by the suspect’s
confederates. Rather than requiring the police to “post a guard” over such
property, I think it is surely reasonable for the police to take the items along
to the station with the arrested person.
Id. at 19. He continued: “I believe this sort of practical evaluation underlies the Court’s
decision permitting clothing, personal effects, and automobiles to be searched without a
warrant as an incident of arrest, even though it would be possible simply to impound
these items until a warrant could be obtained.” Id. at 20. “Such an approach would
simplify the constitutional law of criminal procedure without seriously derogating from
the values protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures.” Id. at 22.
For Justice Blackmun, giving police officers the Hobson’s choice between (a)
leaving an arrestee’s property on a public street or (b) transporting it to the police station
without checking its contents, made little sense. In the years since Chadwick was
decided, other members of the Supreme Court have recognized the impracticality of this
rule. In his concurring opinion in Acevedo, Justice Scalia pointed out:
Under our precedents (as at common law), a person may be arrested outside
the home on the basis of probable cause, without an arrest warrant. Upon
arrest, the person, as well as the area within his grasp, may be searched for
evidence related to the crime. Under these principles, if a known drug
dealer is carrying a briefcase reasonably believed to contain marijuana (the
unauthorized possession of which is a crime), the police may arrest him and
search his person on the basis of probable cause alone. And, under our
precedents, upon arrival at the station house, the police may inventory his
possessions, including the briefcase, even if there is no reason to suspect
that they contain contraband. According to our current law, however, the
19

police may not, on the basis of the same probable cause, take the less
intrusive step of stopping the individual on the street and demanding to see
the contents of his briefcase. That makes no sense a priori, and . . . I see no
reason to continue it.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 584 (Scalia, J. concurring) (internal citations omitted). Echoing the
sentiments of Justice Blackmun’s Chadwick dissent, Justice Scalia urged a “path out of
this confusion” by returning to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement.
Id. at 583.
We agree. “As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’” Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
652 (1995)). “In some circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like,
the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a
warrantless search or seizure reasonable.’” Id. at 1969 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326, 330 (2001)). Still, “[u]rgent government interests are not a license for
indiscriminate police behavior.” Id. at 1970. Thus, to determine whether the warrantless
search of Matthews’ backpack was reasonable “we must balance its intrusion on [his]
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.”
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As an initial matter, we question whether Matthews had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his backpack at the time of his arrest. “[W]hat is reasonable [under the
Fourth Amendment] depends on the context within which a search takes place. The
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legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-á-vis the State may depend upon the
individual’s legal relationship with the State.” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). While “[e]very citizen clearly has an interest in
the privacy of the contents of his or her luggage, briefcase, handbag or any other
container that conceals private papers and effects from public scrutiny,” Acevedo, 500
U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J. dissenting), the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[t]he
expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a
diminished scope,’” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557
(1979)). Matthews, who had two warrants out for his arrest and had been taken into
police custody, could not reasonably expect the contents of his backpack to remain
private.
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court held that “the need for law enforcement
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions
that they must take into custody” outweighed an arrested person’s privacy interest in his
own DNA. Id. at 1970, 1980. The reasoning of King applies in this case. Public safety
officials need “safe and accurate” means to transport “persons and possessions” that they
have taken into custody. And certainly if the government’s interest in correctly
identifying a person taken into custody outweighs that person’s expectation of privacy in
his or her own DNA, the government’s interest in ensuring officer safety while
transporting an arrested person’s luggage outweighs that person’s expectation of privacy
in such luggage (which would be subject to a search as soon as the person arrived at the
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cell block, in any event). Accordingly, we find that Officer Pomeroy’s search of
Matthews’ backpack was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
We recognize that this search does not fall neatly into any of the existing “welldelineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement. However, such exceptions “have been
established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the
application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search” and
“where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers . . . ,
outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.” Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) abrogated on other grounds by Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
Moreover, “[t]he need for a warrant is perhaps least when the search involves no
discretion that could properly be limited by the ‘interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate
between the citizen and the law enforcement officer.’” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)). We find such
circumstances to be present here.
In our view, when a valid arrest has been made in a public place, which requires
that the arrested person be transported from the scene, police may search any luggage that
the person has in his possession at the time of the arrest, and which must accompany him
to the police station, prior to transporting it. As with the inventory search exception,
searches of this type are justified by concerns for officer safety and will be valid whether
or not an officer has probable cause to believe the evidence contains contraband. See
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646 (“It is immaterial whether the police actually fear any
particular package or container; the need to protect against [safety] risks arises
22

independent of a particular officer’s subjective concerns.”); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at
403 (“The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We recognize that “the reach of each exception [must be limited] to that which is
necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.” Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760.
Accordingly, our holding is narrowly tailored to accommodate the eminently important
goal of ensuring police officer safety; it applies only to the luggage of individuals
arrested in public that must be transported along with the arrestee to a police facility.
While “[a]n arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station or confined,”
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645, “[i]t is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is
far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station,” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 234-35 (1973). “Dangerous instrumentalities—such as razor blades, bombs, or
weapons—can be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken from the arrestee’s
possession. The bare recital of these mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by
police to limit these risks.” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 656. Simply put, “[l]aw enforcement
officers should not be precluded from conducting a[] . . . search when they take a
potential ‘Trojan horse’ into their [possession].” Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 21 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting).
Finally, we acknowledge that “the central concern underlying the Fourth
Amendment [is] the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to
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rummage at will among a person’s private effects.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 345. Our holding
today does not open these floodgates. We sanction only those searches of personal
property that occur after a suspect has been validly arrested, where the property itself
must invariably be transported along with the arrestee to the police station. 7 Because “the
suspect’s expectations of privacy are properly abated by the fact of arrest itself,”
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 21 (Blackmun, J. dissenting), we find that such an approach is
reasonable.
D.

Inevitable Discovery
We note that, even if we were to find the search of Matthews’ backpack

unconstitutional, we agree with the District Court that the evidence in question would
have been discovered pursuant to a valid inventory search at the police station when
Matthews was processed, and thus it was properly admitted under the inevitable
discovery doctrine. See Matthews, 2010 WL 2671388, at *7 n.6; Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (Holding that evidence will not be suppressed even if there is a
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Ultimately, we expect this holding will have little practical effect, as police officers
already engage in this practice, and searches such as these have been upheld under other
exceptions to the warrant requirement or the inevitable discovery doctrine. See
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 21 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (“It is also possible that today’s
decision will not have much impact because other doctrines often will be available to
sustain warrantless searches of objects in police custody. As the Court acknowledges, no
warrant is necessary when the authorities suspect the object they have impounded has
dangerous contents. Moreover, police may establish a routine procedure of inventorying
the contents of any container taken into custody, for reasons of security and property
conservation. . . . Finally, exigent circumstances may often justify an immediate search
of property seized in conjunction with an arrest, in order to facilitate the apprehension of
confederates or the termination of continuing criminal activity.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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constitutional violation if we find that the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or statutory provision had taken
place).
III. CONCLUSION
“[T]he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments can only be realized
if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to
reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified
in the interest of law enforcement.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions,
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and
judges eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by
the officer in the field.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 22 n.3 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who
have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 458
(quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)). We believe that we have
fashioned such a standard with our holding today. Thus, we hold that when a valid arrest
has been made in a public place, which requires that the arrested person be transported
from the scene, police may search any luggage that the person has in his possession at the
time of the arrest, and which must accompany him to the police station, prior to
transporting it. Such a search is “reasonable” in a twenty-first century where threats to
25

the safety of police officers include backpacks that conceal bombs, capable of extreme
devastation, which can be triggered remotely. To hold that officers could not search such
containers prior to placing them in their police vehicles would be to make the “criminal
law a trap for the unwary policeman and detract from the important activities of detecting
criminal activity and protecting the public safety.” Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun,
J. dissenting).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Judgment of the District Court. 8

8

As Matthews acknowledges, his argument regarding the constitutionality of the felonin-possession statute is foreclosed by United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.
2001). See Matthews’ Br. at 47 (“While Mr. Matthews acknowledges the binding effect
of Singletary in this Court, he preserves the issue of § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality for
review by the Supreme Court or in any future proceedings in this case or a collateral
action.”). Thus we will not address his arguments here.
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______________________________________________________________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
I concur in the judgment because I agree with my colleagues and the District Court
that the evidence discovered in Matthews’s bag was admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Maj. Op. at 23–24; see also United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132
(2d Cir. 2002). I also agree that the inventory procedure established in Philadelphia
Police Department Memorandum 99-14 (“Policy 99-14”) is a “heads I win, tails you
lose” arrangement that will always result in Matthews’s bag being searched.
Nonetheless, I write separately to express my concern that the warrant exception my
colleagues craft, if it had been precedential, would allow law enforcement officers to skirt
the requirement that inventory searches be conducted in line with standardized criteria or
an established routine. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
To satisfy constitutional requirements, inventory searches must be administrative,
not investigatory, in nature. We allow police officers to catalogue the items in an
arrestee’s possession when he is taken into custody to promote a number of governmental
interests. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). “[I]nventory procedures serve
to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against
claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Id.
We do not permit them so that law enforcement can further its investigatory objectives
under the guise of producing an inventory of impounded items. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
Policy 99-14 is presumably designed to guard against police officers conducting
inventories with investigatory intent by allowing them to perform a warrantless inventory
1

only when they do not believe the luggage contains contraband. As my colleagues aptly
explain, this procedure could be accused of elevating form over substance. Matthews’s
backpack was going to be searched; the only question was the path the arresting officers
were required to take to do so. If they thought there was probable cause to believe his
backpack contained contraband, the policy directed them to obtain a search warrant. If
they thought probable cause did not exist, or the magistrate denied their warrant
application on the ground that there was no probable cause, the policy directed them to
conduct an inventory search.
Though my colleagues and I agree that Officer Pomeroy did not follow this policy
when she searched Matthews’s backpack, we disagree as to the importance of requiring
law enforcement agencies to follow standardized procedures when conducting noninvestigatory searches. As the majority sees it, “when a valid arrest has been made in a
public place, which requires that the arrestee be transported from the scene, police may
search any luggage that the arrestee has in his possession at the time of the arrest, and
which must accompany the arrestee to the station, prior to transporting it.” 1 Maj. Op. at
22. By creating this new exception, they authorize police to conduct inventory searches
that do not follow standardized procedure or routine. This is both contrary to precedent
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The majority’s careful caveat that the luggage must need to be accompanied to the
station in order to justify the search invites the “next case” question of what happens if
someone is arrested with another person who is not arrested (say the arrestee’s mother or
girlfriend). No probable cause exists to seek a warrant to search the arrestee’s bag, and
the accompanying person is willing to take the bag. There is no probable cause, no safety
concern, and no need for an inventory at the station. If the non-arrested person is not
permitted to take the luggage, is not any search of it solely for investigatory purposes?
2

and, in my view, a slippery slope. It also makes irrelevant the other established
exceptions—search-incident-to-arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315,
321 (3d Cir. 2010), and exigent circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Kreimes, 649
F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (5th Cir. 1981)—that may justify a warrantless search of the luggage
of an arrestee in custody.
My colleagues suggest that they are not authorizing an inventory search, but a
search pursuant to the transportation of an arrestee. I see little difference between the two
“types” of searches. Both are administrative, not investigatory, in nature. And both are
intended, in part, to secure officer safety. I neither doubt the importance of this objective
nor disagree that an arrestee’s privacy must at times give way to it. My disagreement is
with whether we should require police to follow established criteria when conducting
these sorts of administrative searches. If police leadership thinks safety concerns justify
the need to search an arrestee’s bags prior to his transportation to the stationhouse,
requiring it to implement an established procedure to regulate those searches is a minimal
burden that I see no reason to discard. 2
The Supreme Court has held that “reasonable police regulations relating to
inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” Bertine,
479 U.S. at 374; see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). It has always
2

The majority notes that it “need not decide if an ‘inventory search’ conducted outside of
the stationhouse comports with the Fourth Amendment, even if governed by standardized
procedures.” Maj. Op. at 17 n.6. Other Courts of Appeals have approved inventory
searches conducted at the site of arrest, as opposed to at the stationhouse, provided they
are performed according to established criteria. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 681
F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 980 (2013).
3

“adhered to the requirement,” however, “that inventories be conducted according to
standardized criteria.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375 n. 6. This requirement “tend[s] to ensure
that the intrusion w[ill] be limited in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the
caretaking function.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976). And it does
not become “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence.” Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. Indeed, in Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013), a
case relied on heavily by the majority for the proposition that an arrestee’s privacy
interests are outweighed by the need to protect officer safety, the administrative DNA
search the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional was conducted in accordance with
detailed procedural requirements established by the Maryland DNA Collection Act. Id.
at 1967, 1979–80; see also id. at 1983–86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (based in part on the
view that the DNA-collection procedures revealed that the searches had an investigatory,
not an administrative, intent).
We have previously addressed the role of standardized procedures when vehicles
are impounded and searched by police. United States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
2010); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991). Following the Supreme
Court’s ruling that inventory procedures may lawfully provide officers with discretion in
conducting the search “so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity,” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, we have permitted inventories conducted pursuant to
criteria that limit officer discretion in two ways. “First, it must limit the officer’s
discretion regarding whether to search a seized vehicle. Second, the pre-existing criteria
4

or routine must limit an officer’s discretion regarding the scope of an inventory search,
particularly with respect to the treatment of closed containers.” Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1120
(emphases in original). “These limitations,” as we have explained, make certain “that
officers performing these caretaking functions are ‘not allowed so much latitude that
inventory searches are turned into a purposeful and general means of discovering
evidence of a crime.’” Mundy, 621 F.3d at 288 (quoting Wells, 495 U.S. at 4).
The need to circumscribe officer discretion is equally applicable in the context of
luggage searches. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648 (“[W]e hold that it is not ‘unreasonable’
for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to
search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory
procedures.”). When they seize a bag “‘in circumstances that suggest a probability of
discovering criminal evidence, the officers will inevitably be motivated in part by
criminal investigative objectives.’” Mundy, 621 F.3d at 294 (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 574 F.3d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 2008)). The use of standardized procedures helps to
prevent these investigatory objectives from driving the occurrence and nature of the
search.
Though my colleagues wisely limit their holding to the search of luggage
impounded when an arrestee is taken into custody, there may be no principled way to
prevent this exception from creeping into other contexts. “It remains a ‘cardinal principle
that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” California v. Acevedo, 500
5

U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)) (emphasis in
original). By creating a new exception, we run the risk of inverting this presumption.
Admittedly, Policy 99-14 is so broad that it can result in officers universally
searching the luggage of arrestees taken into custody, the same result that may be
produced by my colleagues’ new exception to obtaining a warrant. But this does not
mean that insisting on the use of standardized procedures is purposeless. Conducting
such searches per predetermined criteria ensures that officers are uniformly searching
luggage in this manner and not singling out some arrestees on the basis of an
investigatory suspicion that falls short of probable cause. In addition, though we do not
pass on the permissibility of the Policy 99-14, there may be instances where we
determine that police regulations are unreasonable in light of the administrative interests
these searches are intended to serve.
For these reasons, I do not endorse my colleagues’ rule that officers transporting
an arrestee from a public arrest site may conduct a warrantless search of any luggage in
the arrestee’s possession without following standardized procedures.
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